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**'WAR IS POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS' (CLAUSEWITZ).
THE RHODESIAN CONFLICT 1972 - 1979.**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS (HONOURS) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
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PREFACE

It is intended in this assignment to examine the course of the Guerrilla War, and the significance and value to Rhodesia of cross-border raids. The causes and effects of the October 1978 attacks on Zipra positions in Zambia will be used as a case study to demonstrate whether such raids were functional or dysfunctional to Rhodesia's internal and international position.

CHRONOLOGY

1893

BSAC occupies Southern Rhodesia.

1896-7

The first Chimerenga is crushed by Rhodesian forces.

1923

Southern Rhodesia becomes a 'self-governing' colony.

1953

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland is founded.

1961

ZAPU formed after the banning of the N.D.P.

1963

ZANU formed by Sithole and ZAPU dissidents.

First ZANU recruits go to China for training 31 December,

Federation dissolved.

1965

11 November, Unilateral Declaration of Independence, to last 'weeks rather than months'. Voluntary sanctions imposed by United Nations.

1966

Sinoia attack by 'Crocodile Group'.

U.N. declares Rhodesia 'a threat to world peace' and imposes selective mandatory sanctions.

Wilson's 'No Independence before majority rule' (NIBMAR) policy.

1967

First serious incursion by ZIRRA/ANC guerrillas

- Operation Nickel.

South African Police arrive in Rhodesia.

Tiger talks.

1968

Operations, Cauldron and Griffin, successfully concluded by Rhodesian Security Forces.

UN imposes comprehensive Mandatory sanctions.

Fearless talks.

1969

Sithole denounces 'armed struggle' and is dismissed as ZANU president.

ZANU/Frelimo alliance.

1970

US and UK veto tougher sanctions.

March, Rhodesia declared a republic.

1971

Smith accepts Home proposals.

Frizoli formed.

ANC formed by Muzorewa.

1972

Pearce Commission.

Zanla infiltrates from Mozambique.

December, first white killed since 1966.

The war begins in earnest.

1973

Smith closes Zambian border - Kaunda keeps it closed.

'Operation Hurricane' launched in North East.

'Protective Villages' policy started.

Selous Scouts formed.

Rhodesians start to lose war for 'hearts and minds'.

1974

Portuguese Government overthrown in military coup - Frelimo under Machel control Mozambique.

Rhodesians initiate raids into Mozambique and Zambia.

In July election, Smith's RF wins all 50 white seats.

Lusaka declaration of Unity -

UANC formed to unite. Frizoli, ZANU and ZAPU.

1975

Chitepo assassinated in Lusaka

- ZANU leaders detained by Kaunda, 129 guerrillas deported to Rhodesia.

Mozambique is granted independence under Machel.

Nkomo and Smith 'Declaration of Intent to hold a constitutional conference'.

SAP withdrawn.

Victoria Falls Conference.

1976

Zanla insurgents penetrate the East RSP's raid deeper into Mozambique.

Machel closes border and 'declares war'.

Selous Scouts and SAS attack on Nyandzonia/Pungwe - over 1000 'guerrillas' killed or wounded.

Smith/Nkomo negotiations fail.

Anglo-American proposals with Verster's support - Smith accepts majority rule in two years.

Patriotic front formed between ZAWU and ZAPU.

Geneva Conference.

1977

Owen-Young proposals - rejected by Smith, negotiates with 'internal' nationalists.

Rhodesian/South African relations improve.

Guerrilla war escalates.

RSP's strike at Mozambique - including Chimoio and Tembae.

1978

'Salisbury Four', Muzorewa, Smith, Sithole and Chirau sign
'internal agreement'.

Transitional government fails to curb war.

Elim and Viscount massacres.

This 'stroke of fate' ends Smith/Wkomo negotiations.

'Green Leader' attacks on Zambia.

Kaunda reopens border.

1979

White referendum accepts 'majority rule'.

Second Viscount shot down.

Muzorewa's UANC wins elections - but Zimbabwe - Rhodesia

Government not recognised by Britain or UN.

Conservatives win British Elections.

Lusaka Conference.

Lancaster House Conference - agreement signed on 21 December.

Lord Soames arrives (11 December).

27 December, cease fire - war ends.

1980

Mugabe and ZANU (PF) win resounding electoral victory - 57 of
the 80 black seats.

18 April, Zimbabwe granted independence.

THE INTRODUCTION

The Rhodesian conflict of 1966 to 1979 is enlightening in a variety of ways - especially as in many respects it reflects elements of a possible future scenario for Southern Africa. The Guerrilla war is a textbook study of insurgency/counter-insurgency tactics, reflecting in its course a variety of guerrilla forms, ranging from Zipras Soviet method to the Guevarian and Maoist inspired method favoured by Zanla. It also demonstrates how an efficient mobile counter-insurgency force may effectively be deployed to combat such guerrilla activity.

The war, however, also reveals the difficulties, limits and ultimate futility of having a largely conventional force face such a diffuse concealed threat, particularly if these forces do not have the support of the mass of the population, especially as information gatherers. The virtual inevitability of having to take the initiative to the insurgents wherever they are to be found, even if this involves striking across ones borders into the territory of independent states harbouring and supporting the infiltrators. The effect of such action, particularly on Rhodesia's standing in the international arena is markedly significant. Rhodesia was roundly condemned for this practice, even by South Africa, despite it being an acceptable tactic employed throughout the counter-insurgency world, including even Britain and the United States.

In tackling this conflict, the Rhodesian Government evolved a strategy whereby conventional military superiority was used as a psychological weapon, bolstering the flagging white morale and confidence, thereby combatting sanctions, physical demands and economic regression, while shattering the opposition's morale. This was used also, to undermine the ability of the Nationalists to maintain the insurgency campaign and to wring significant concessions from them at the negotiating table. Ironically this strategy was more effective in influencing the front-line states rather than the Nationalist leaders themselves, who were seldom personally involved in direct action, and whose resolve was often strengthened by these activities which reflected favourably on their international standing and support. Such raids, also clearly demonstrated Rhodesia's failure to control the internal conflict, in other words, they reflected the essential weakness of intervention.

Rhodesia's obvious military superiority at the beginning of the campaign, coupled with her ability to overcome sanctions and South Africa's support, led to her ignoring, until it was too late, the most vital element of all - the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of her black population, overwhelmingly rural, and constituting well over ninety percent of the population. This is a seminal principle of Mao's strategy and one Zapu/Zanla took to heart while Ian Smith, safe in the belief that 'We have the happiest Africans in the world' ignored the advice and evidence that contradicted this view.

Guerrilla war is by its very nature, war of the weak against the strong. In Rhodesia it was the 'war of the flea'¹ the Nationalists unable to face and defeat Rhodesian forces in conventional combat 'were' forced to torment, terrorize and cripple the white 'regime' economically and politically through subversive activity which would eventually bring about total military collapse. The terrorist forces which at their height numbered approximately 22 000, with up to 13 000 operational within Rhodesia while the Rhodesian forces figures were 46 000 and 25 000 respectively, 15 000 of this number were highly professional regulars.² More significantly than numbers, however, were the superior quality of the Rhodesian forces in terms of physical and psychological condition, fighting ability, mobility, leadership and equipment, especially air-strike capability and helicopter support. However, the war ended in military deadlock. The war was, from the Rhodesian point of view a 'no win' situation, few 'popular' guerrilla wars have ever been lost by the guerrillas. Their aim was merely to destroy the government's ability to uphold law and order and, thereby their will to govern.

'Will' is one of Mao's seminal concerns³, he felt all other factors were subservient to will, the force with the greater will would inevitably win. In Rhodesia white will bolstered by military might, the fact that they were fighting for their homes and their belief that they were superior was more than a match for the 'poorly trained, lead and motivated guerrilla armies. They had been forced to flee their homeland and were able to survive only by sneaking back; faced incredible

psychological and physical deprivation and apparently achieved little other than virtually certain death for their sacrifices. However, this was to change when the weight of black popular will and support was thrown behind them, while simultaneously white will was eroded by the protracted physical struggle, international condemnation and economic regressions. The fall of white Rhodesia was inevitable, however, when she would fall was unclear. A negotiated settlement was the only solution, yet Smith uncomprehending still of the actual condition of his country, held out for too much and grasped at straws, a factor that prolonged the war for at least three years.

As in any such conflict terminology can be extremely emotive and cause grave offence consequently terms such as 'goek' or 'terrorist', 'liberator' or 'freedom fighter' have been replaced by the value neutral terms, insurgents/counter-insurgents or guerrilla/Security Forces. By guerrilla is meant an insurgent living off the land or local population on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, as opposed to 'commandos' who are temporary, 'self-supporting' insurgents, usually on specific missions. If an emotive term should appear in the text it is representative of a particular viewpoint as expressed by one of the protagonists.

I. THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

The roots of the Rhodesian war lie quite simply in the white minorities refusal to allow the black majority, the social and political rights they felt they deserved.

The first violent opposition to white rule was of course the 1896 Rebellion. This bloody revolt started in Matabeleland but soon spread to Mashonaland, and with the element of surprise, and the absence of a united white military force, resulted in hundreds of white deaths. The 1897 white backlash was, however, far bloodier, hundreds of blacks were slaughtered and all the ringleaders, or religious leaders, who could be found were executed.

Repression of the revolt and the measures following it were so effective that for the following half-century there was no African challenge of any note to white authority. The first stirrings of opposition came in the form of black railway workers strike in 1945 and a general strike in 1948. These glimmerings gained ground and African opposition to the federation grew - many blacks saw this as an extension of white exploitation. It was only in the 1950s that African Nationalism as such arose through a range of organizations: the ANC being the first. It was banned in 1959 (along with its young president Joshua Nkomo), in 1960 the NDP took its place and in its turn was banned being replaced in 1961 by Zapu within a year. Nkomo

reacted to its banning by retaining Zapu as an external party.

The 1961 constitutional question gave real effect to African Nationalist Opposition. 1960 was the peak year for independence in Africa, which considerably heartened the Rhodesian Nationalists. They felt sufficiently encouraged to petition Britain and reject the multi - racial constitution as insufficient. Majority rule in 15 years ^{WAS} not acceptable to the Nationalists. The failure of any of the Nationalist movements peaceful, constitutional (i.e. lawful) representations through channels to realize significant positive results led to increasing frustration, radicalization and violence. In July 1960 the BSAP shot 18 rioting Africans in Bulawayo the first such deaths since 1897. This marked the start of the 'ZIII' or violent extra-legal struggle. Chikerema admitted that the decision to use political violence had been taken in 1960. 'not for the purpose of guerrilla warfare but to influence the British Government and the settlers in Rhodesia to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people in Zimbabwe.'¹

In 1962 a Government White Paper listed 33 cases of petrol bombings, 18 arson attacks on schools, 10 on churches, as well as 27 attacks on communications.²

Compromise politics were clearly failing but instead of more negotiation, both sides turned away. When under Ian Smith the more radical Rhodesian front was elected to power, the African Nationalists turned increasingly to violence. The Guevara states in Guerrilla Warfare

'People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate otherwise the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.'³

By 1963 this stage had clearly been reached, the Nationalists had accepted armed struggle as necessary. In 1964, Choa En - lai, on a visit to Africa, said 'revolutionary prospects throughout the African continent are excellent'⁴. The same year the first Nationalist recruits were sent to Nanking for training, while others were trained in various African countries.⁵

Meanwhile the Nationalists, who had been split by the Sithole led Zanu defection from Zapu, fought among themselves, often violently. This seriously compromised their tactic which Pustay termed 'subversive infiltration', i.e. the external parties (Zanu too was banned)⁶ sent organizers into Rhodesia. However, stringent legislative measures and effective police action and intelligence successfully constrained this situation, furthermore, the Nationalists continued to appeal to the British to intercede, a policy which continued until the late 60s. Britain, in real terms, had little influence over her colony, which makes the Unilateral Declaration of Independence rather surprising.

II THE SECOND CHIMERENGA

UDI was an act lacking any foresight, while it is true that Rhodesia faced no real security problem in 1965, internal dissention had been repressed to easily controllable levels, guerrilla insurgency was non-existent and only the relatively short and inhospitable Zambian border offered any threat. South African economic support, and total support (including diplomatic recognition) was promised by Portugal.¹ However, British including commonwealth and international support would be withdrawn and most likely redirected towards Nationalist movements.

Smith's boast of 'never in a thousand years' would majority rule come to Rhodesia', was clearly overly optimistic especially as the African population, newly politicised since the unrest of the 1960's, clearly understood the implications of UDI and Smith's speech. In fact UDI was probably the single greatest step towards 'majority rule' ever taken in Rhodesia - the war should have finished in 1976 were it not for stubborn action on both sides. However, Wilson's prediction that 'the accumulative effect of economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months'² was equally optimistic, as Rhodesia flourished in spite of Wilson and the UN's weakly applied voluntary sanctions of January 1966.

From hindsight it is possible to discern that possibly the most significant immediate result of U.D.I. was popular

ZAPU



PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS ARE ZAPU'S PROBLEMS.
ZAPU'S PROBLEMS ARE THE PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS.

The white settlers hold ~~the~~^{our} country and rule us against our will by force of armed suppression. Because of this, ZAPU, in 1964, concluded and declared that " There is no going back, Guns or no guns, prisons or no prisons, restrictions or no restrictions, Wha Wha or no Wha Wha, Gonakudzingwa or no Gonakudzingwa we are prepared to crush settler minority rule whatever the price.

Whether by day or by night, at any place, we have to confront the enemy by guns, stones, sticks, bottles, spears and by any means we can lay our hands on in order to crush the enemy. We have to fight for our freedom and independence or die under colonialism, racism and oppression.

We must remove by force, the white minority rule in order to gain our freedom to govern ourselves in our own way, in our own country ZIMBABWE.

The land and all its natural resources belong to the African people of Zimbabwe, and we will come all those who believe in majority rule whatever their colour or creed.

Under the people's Government led by ZAPU, the people shall share the wealth of Zimbabwe. Therefore, all Zimbabweans are called upon to take part in the Armed Revolution which ZAPU is waging day and night against the minority rule of white settlers.

We say NO to the exploitation of a nation by a nation, NO to oppression and NO to exploitation of man by man.

Join ZAPU now the people's force and voice. Zapu shall win.

PEOPLE ARE THE POWER AND POWER IS THE PEOPLE

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African opposition. A Zanu official Davis M. M'Gabe described the nationalists reaction.

'... for all those who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course which cannot be altered. 11 November 1965 marked the turning point of the struggle for freedom in that land from constitutional and political one to primarily military struggle.'³

Zapu's Gumbo said at his trial for 'terrorism', 'We realized that only one people can run a country. It should be the Africans.'⁴

However, despite broadcasts into the country encouraging open rebellion and acts of arson, stonings and sabotage, such as, crop destruction, breaking fences, cattle dips etc., the nationalists still courted international intervention rather than self-reliance. The widespread unrest following UDI was brought under control by an alert police force, but was an expensive and lengthy process that clogged the courts for months. More important was that the Smith government had already started to lose the 'hearts and minds' of the majority of the population.

In 1964 the nationalists launched their 'armed' attack on Rhodesia.

In M' Gabe's words 'the beginning of Guerrilla warfare.'⁵
The 'Crocodile commando' amateurish and ill prepared
'ambushed' a white factory worker and his family on a
deserted road and managed to stab him fatally before
turning tail.

In April April 1966, the real infiltration started. Seven
members of a Zanu unit were killed near Sinoia by a largely
unsuspecting and unprepared police squad. In May another
Zanu group shot dead an unsuspecting white farmer and his
wife - only one guerrilla party escaped the police net, the
others were tried and convicted a number being hanged
(despite the Queen's pardon). The effects of these raids
on the white populace were negligible, and they failed
completely in their aim of disrupting the economy. Farmers,
far from being driven off the land, merely became more wary,
yet few took significant precautions at this stage. More
significant was the effect on the African populace as security
forces overreacted in their endeavours to 'flush out the
terrs ' thereby alienating those tribesman who bore the
brunt of their search.


Kees Maxey and Michael Raeburn⁶ have argued that insurgency
in the 1960's was much more common, widespread and protracted
than the Security Forces realized. Hassan Chimutengwende
for instance claimed to have 'stayed at large for eight
whole months in Rhodesia, moving from village to village,'
spreading the 'Gospel of Action.'⁷ This also suggests that the
Nationalists were taking Maoist theory to heart 'guerrillas
are like the fish and the people are the sea '⁸ in gathering

mass support for their cause. The lack of local support had been a seminal factor in the discovery and destruction of insurgents.


On 15 August 1967, James Chirema^{KE} (Zapu) and Oliver Tambo (ANC) announced an alliance but political objectives remained vague 'to fight the common settler enemy to the finish at any point of encounter.'⁹ The combined forces were large and easier for the Security forces to find which resulted in contacts becoming more common and casualties, on both sides, rising. In a series of engagements in mid 1967, Operation Nickel SF's claimed 31 insurgents killed and a similar number captured for the loss of 7 security force deaths and twice that number wounded.¹⁰ These actions seriously stretched the RSF's ability despite the highly efficient mobile tactic they employed. As a result and using the presence of ANC guerrilla's as legitimization SAP paramilitary units were sent to curb infiltration from Zambia. In 1968 the value of this alliance was demonstrated when between January and March 58 insurgents (43 Zapu and 15 SAANC) were killed, and a similar number captured for the loss of 7 security force members in July out of a group of 91 insurgents, 80 even killed or captured for the loss of only 1 SAP man.¹¹

Zapu's G. Silundika,

'Despite our losses, the impact of the combat helped to mobilize the masses. The settlers had to admit that these were Africans waging an armed struggle in Zimbabwe.'¹²



Swapo, ZIPRA, ZANLA, A.N.C. and Frelimo bases



The severe military setbacks of the fledgling guerrilla armies and failure to achieve any significant goals, combined with the psychological problems and physical hardship of exile led to a serious loss of morale. Particularly significant was the disarray of leadership, and tensions and divisions arose within Zanu and Zapu.

In fact 'faction' fighting between nationalists was sufficiently serious for Kaunda to deport 60 'dissidents' (mostly Zanu; thus revealing his pro-Zapu bias) a number of whom were tried as terrorists' and sentenced to death.¹³

The failure in the formation of a 'united front' in Frizoli clearly reflects nationalist divisions all that was achieved was an insignificant third force created out of Zanu and Zapu deserters. Edward Ndlovu, Zapu's National Secretary denounced it as 'an organization based on exiles and without origins among the Zimbabwe masses.'¹⁴

Dissention, lack of motivation and equipment meant that military incursions were stopped until 1972, however the infiltration of political agents continued without the Security Force realizing it. In 1970, Chikerema acting Zapu Chairman said

'... This is really a protracted struggle we do not intend to finish in a matter of two, three, four or five years ... we're changing our tactics ... where they don't see us we will go to our own areas and infiltrate ourselves into the population and organize our masses.'¹⁵

Against this backdrop of guerrilla failure and SF success, economic prosperity¹⁶ and high white morale occurred the HMS Tiger (December 1966) and HMS Fearless talks (September 1968). The Tiger proposals reflected a revision of the modified 1961 constitution, but when Smith rejected this, Wilson held, 'in future no grant of independence will be contemplated unless African Majority rule is already an accomplished fact' - the NIBMAR principle.¹⁷ The Fearless terms abandoned the NIBMAR pledge and made considerable concessions, despite the fact that these would have resulted in no majority rule that century. Smith despite initial enthusiasm, gave in to the fears of the radicals in his cabinet and rejected the proposals. At no time during these negotiations were the nationalists consulted, which aroused nationalist suspicions, the exclusion of the Africans from the talks can only mean that a conspiracy against the African people was being worked out.'¹⁸

Fearless was particularly unacceptable and marked a shift from encouraging British intervention, towards 'We are our own liberators.'¹⁹

Clearly Smith felt sufficiently secure to reject the highly favourable proposals, that offered largely cosmetic multi - racialism. The apparent inaction of nationalists was probably a significant part of the decision, despite increasing levels of political violence and other evidence of Nationalist underground activity. In 1970, the RF with an 81 percent mandate from the white population declared Rhodesia a Republic.

III WAR AND PEARCE (1972 - 1976)

In 1971 the new Conservative Government in Britain and the Rhodesian Government agreed on terms for legitimate independence. Blacks were to achieve parliamentary majority - but at the earliest, this was likely to occur in 2035.

Sir Alec Douglas Home describes the proposals as 'fair and honourable, and can lead to the partnership and prosperity of all Rhodesians.'¹ There was, however, to be a test of its acceptability to 'all' Rhodesia's population.

African reaction to the proposals was sharp. Bishop Abel Muserewa, who formed the avowedly non-violent African National Council, described the proposals as '.... both an insult to the people and a prescription for a bloodbath.'² Political violence escalated dramatically with the African National Council launching the "No" campaign. The external Nationalists recognised the ANC as a ' Legitimate political phenomenon with its roots in mass political support'³ and they praised it as it represented 'Nationalism and their desire for freedom.'⁴

The findings of the Pearce Commission were a major shock to the whites, 'Most Europeans stunned by the verdict. They had fostered the illusion that "our loyal Africans" would support the proposals.'⁵ The Pearce Commission had met 114 600 Africans, of these 107 309 had rejected the proposals, while a further 41 000 written objections had been received.⁶ The implication of the 'NO' vote, coupled to the overwhelming rejection by the African soldiers of these proposals was a harsh blow to White Rhodesia. It shattered any semblance of legitimacy which the

Salisbury Government might have claimed, and, as they realized the extent of the opposition, destroyed white morale, however, the Nationalist and internal parties, including the A.N.C. were greatly heartened by the findings. 'For once the black majority had defeated their white masters. A sense of victory seemed to restore self-confidence and offer hope of final victory and liberation.'⁷

This mood of increased political consciousness was marked by a new guerrilla onslaught of Rhodesia, despite the March, 1972 failure by Zanu and Zapu to form a Joint Military Command.⁸ Zapu followed a new 'hit and run' policy, which relied heavily on landmines for its success. Herbert Chitepo of Zanu, realizing that it 'is useless to engage in conventional warfare with well equipped Rhodesian and South African troops along the Zambezi'⁹ also pursued new tactics. Zanu intended undermining the belief in white invincibility and, through the breakdown of law and order, destroy the Government's ability to administer outlying areas, this included attacking government personnel and administrative infrastructure in rural areas.

This change in tactics, with its emphasis on politicization of the populace soon paid dividends as increased local support made the insurgents difficult to find. The Nationalists used all the means at their disposal, from intimidation to Spirit Mediums, to win support, while the Rhodesian Government was lagging badly in the fight for 'hearts and minds.'

1972 was, for those in the 'know', the watershed of the Rhodesian conflict - the balance had tipped in favour of the guerrillas. General Walls, who firmly believed that political and military solutions went hand-in-hand¹⁰ 'felt that Rhodesia was losing the political war.' Ken Flower and much of O.C.C. concurred. Particularly worrying on the military side, was the opening by Frelimo of Tete Province to guerrilla incursions; especially as guerrilla's were also understood to be operating out of Botswana.¹¹ In one foul swoop, the whole western border, plus the vulnerable North East (Operation Hurricane) had been laid open to incursion, and, Rhodesian Security Forces would be hardpressed to defend effectively such a large area. This forced Walls to admit that Rhodesia was fighting a 'No-Win War',¹² yet generally morale was high, particularly in the Army which anticipated an end to boredom and unactivity, and this spirit pervaded even the highest echelons, imbuing them with a sense of optimism.

During January 1973, as a response to increased guerrilla activity, Smith closed the Zambian border. Kaunda, as the aggrieved party, immediately closed his border, ensuring that criticism from all quarters would p_ur over Smith. South Africa and Portugal, who had not been consulted but who feared for their considerable economic interests, as well as international, moderate and radical groups within Rhodesia, were particularly vociferous. This measure not only had no favourable effect on incursions but cost Rhodesia Eight hundred and sixteen million Rhodesian dollars in lost rail revenue.¹³ This economic damage was compounded by a dramatic fall in tourist revenue following the killing of two Canadians and the wounding of an American

by Zambian troops, during May, 1973. The Zambians claimed to be firing at 'Rhodesian Sabateurs' at the time.

The reaction of the Rhodesian Government, to the increase in incursion was both massive and unnecessarily damaging to their position within the country. Centenary was immediately proclaimed a 'restricted area' and its inhabitants screened, while in 1973, Operation Overlord, an attempt to erect a cordon sanitaire around the local tribespeople, thereby denying guerrillas their support, led to enormous dissatisfaction as the people were forcibly removed from their tribal lands and resettled in protected villages. As one tribesman stated in his view of this process. 'They put us behind the wire they said to protect us. But they were not protecting us, they are treating us like animals. That's why we wanted to meet the boys. They said they were our liberators'¹⁴, by 1979 there were to be over three hundred thousand such people, in over two hundred protected villages.¹⁵ At the same time a compulsory labour system, which also evoked considerable opposition, was introduced. In conjunction with the cordon sanitaire principle, the government launched a psychological warfare campaign, pamphlets featuring dead guerrillas, offering rewards for information and carrying warnings from Spirit Mediums were distributed. This, together with an amnesty for guerrillas who surrendered, in the face of draconian government action, largely failed in its objective. Particularly damaging to government support was a policy of collective fines (usually levied in cattle) and punishment, this alienated whole communities who

Rhodesian police use dogs and weapons to forcibly remove the Tangwena people from their land.






REWARDS

You are reminded that large rewards continue to be paid to those persons who give information leading directly to the death or capture of terrorists and their weapons.

Do not be afraid to report all you know about the whereabouts of terrorists and their weapons because your identity will be kept secret and the reward you earn will be paid to you privately. You can choose to be paid in cash or the money can be put into a Post Office or Building Society savings account in your name.

Look at the amounts shown against the terrorists and their weapons in the photograph below.



Other terrorist weapons not shown in the photograph above also qualify for the payment of a reward. The amounts vary according to the type of weapon and the quantity thereof.

REPORT QUICKLY!

Printed by the Government Printer

rapidly began to regard the guerrillas as their liberators from repression. Making it easy for the guerrillas to follow Mao's advice on how to exploit local discontent. The Smith Government following ^valso failed to implement (their "Half-a-Loaf" Policy) political reform, which may have helped swing popular support to their cause.

In 1973, Smith initiated negotiations with the internal Nationalists', however, he stipulated that the 1971 proposals must form the basis for any negotiations, and although Muzorewa called for the repeal of the Land Tenure Act, and parity of African Representation in Parliament, Smith was clearly not ready to settle, and in fact dismissed the A.N.C. demands as 'totally and absolutely unacceptable, individually or as a whole, and as nothing less than the old parrot-cry for "One man, one vote"¹⁶ Muzorewa however, appealed "if these demands can be granted, then we can find a solution and settle the constitutional dispute."¹⁷ But the negotiations failed and no internal agreement was obtained. The following year (1974) Smith stated '.... our stand is clear and unambiguous. Settlement is desirable, but only on our terms. Fortunately, we speak from a position of strength and there is no need for any panic rush decisions.'¹⁸

Despite Smith's speech, events and decisions outside Rhodesia were already shaping her future. Portuguese control over Mozambique had been eroding steadily since 1972, and in 1974 a military camp in Lisbon toppled the Caetano regime, leading

to the independence of Mozambique under the leadership of Samora Machel of Frelimo. The white population and politicians of Rhodesia, while showing concern, did not seem to comprehend the true significance of this move, but the South African's and the Military hierarchy of Rhodesia certainly did. Rhodesia, now, save for its short southern border, was totally surrounded by hostile states, all of them supporting the Nationalist guerrilla movements. Rhodesia could not hope to defend so large an area against insurgents, particularly as the Mozambique border was perfectly designed to aid infiltrators. This factor induced South African Prime Minister Vorster to launch his 'Normalization of Relations' Policy.

Vorster, in pleading for co-existence rather than confrontation, stated: 'Southern Africa is at a cross roads and has to chose now between peace and escalating conflict. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it will be too high for South Africa to pay there is an alternative, there is a way. That is the way of peace, the way of normalizing relations, the way of sound understanding and normal association.'¹⁹ This theme was quickly picked up by Kenneth Kaunda, who welcomed Vorster's speech as the 'Voice of reason for which Southern Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting.'²⁰ High level deputations operated between Pretoria and Lusaka, while South Africa used her not inconsiderable influence to bring Smith to heel, Salisbury issued careful statements accepting the constitutional conference.

The Front Line States pressured the various Nationalist organisations into an alliance, albeit an uneasy and short lived one. The 'historic signing',²¹ in December 1976 of the Lusaka agreement, united Zanu, Zapu and Frizoli under the banner of the new United African National Council under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. At this period South Africa could exert considerable pressure on the Rhodesian Government, due to support covering not only fiscal, economic, supply and diplomatic matters, but also the incremental and gradual withdrawal of paramilitary forces from the region. The Rhodesians demanded 'an immediate and total ceasefire in the Liberation War.'²² The UANC wanted the release of all political detainees, the revoking of the death penalty, general amnesty, free political activity and the lifting of the state of emergency. Nyrere added fuel to the fire by demanding immediate majority rule, and Ian Smith was not even prepared to discuss the immediate 'transfer of power from the minority to the majority - that is to say, majority rule now.'²³ Clearly there was little agreement between the parties, who really had absolutely no desire to negotiate, but had been forced to the conference table by the wishes of various outside states. It is therefore hardly surprising that the August 1975, Victoria Falls Conference ended without any agreement being reached. However, it has some significance in that for the first time the "Nationalists" as a whole, and the Rhodesians had had to negotiate.

This period of detente was characterized by massive dissent within the Nationalist ranks. Mostly this conflict was caused by personal political or ideological differences or by personal power struggles exacerbated by the pressure placed on the groups by the Front Line States.

Zanu, the most radical of the Nationalist groups, believed neogitation to be pointless unless military and economic pressure on the Rhodesians, could be increased, consequently they perceived internal dissent to be caused by pro-detente groups, including the Zambian Government, attempting to 'destroy and weaken Zanu from within' as in the Nheri Rebellion, for instance, when they exploited existing grievances, some of them legitimate, to organise a small group of guerrillas to cause havoc within the party. They believed that in a situation of chaos, the existing radical leadership would be overthrown.²⁴ The most significant conflict however, surrounds the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, Chairman of Zanu, on 17 March 1975, in Lusaka. The assassination was blamed on the dissident radical element in Zanu, including Tongogara and Chitepo's body guard, by the Zambian Government, who promptly arrested and charged over a thousand Zanu Military leaders and personnel. The findings on the murder, by a 'Special International Commission' were almost universally accepted, even by the Nationalists. Muzorewa also agreed that 'Leaders within Zanu itself had killed Mr Chitepo'²⁵, while Sithole nominal leader of Zanu, confirmed the findings of the commission, admitting Zanu's responsibility for the murder, and calling the period a 'black chapter' in Zanu's history.²⁶ Ken Flower, however, admitted that the CIO

had set the bomb²⁷, while in 1985 a newspaper reported that an ex-S.A.S. commando and a CIO agent had been responsible.²⁸ Only Mugabe was correct when he placed the blame for the death of Chitepo, on 'Rhodesian Agents operating in Zambia.'²⁹ Chitepo's assassination was one of the most successful and productive intelligence ploys of the war, as Zanu was reduced to chaos, and of the 129 guerrillas deported to Rhodesia, a number were executed.³⁰

More significant than the disagreements within the individual groups was the inter-party conflict, for while there was widespread animosity between Zapu and Zanu, in 1975, actual combat often occurred. Such as the affray which broke out in June 1975 during which the Zanu inhabitants of a joint Nationalist camp, with the aid of their Chinese instructors killed twenty one Zapu recruits, while twenty eight others disappeared.³¹ These internecine conflicts seriously disrupted infiltration, while rival groups within Rhodesia, on occasion fought each other rather than their avowed enemy, the Rhodesians. Vorster's detente initiative, which kept most of the Nationalist groups at the negotiating table also helped reduce the number of incursions. However, by 1976, much of the conflict had diminished markedly, due to President Kaunda's action against militants, but mainly due to the moving of Zanu's Headquarters to Tanzania and Mozambique, where they were separated from Zapu elements. Negotiations had also stagnated and failed with indeed very little prospect of revival due to South Africa's involvement with Angola and despite the Smith/Nkomo overtures, a marked increase in both guerrilla incursion and

action within Rhodesia was being led by Zanu forces coming from the Eastern border, and there were renewed promises, from the O.A.U. and the Frontline States, of support for intensified guerrilla offensives.

The collapse of the South Africa sponsored detente and the breakdown in March of the Smith/Nkomo talks, induced Britain and the United States to adopt a new detente initiative. Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State) began a rapid round of 'shuttle diplomacy' in an effort to gain acceptance of the Anglo-American Settlement package. This postulated 'responsible majority rule,' which in effect meant majority rule with electoral security and economic control left firmly in white hands. This was an offer the Smith Government could, particularly in regard to Rhodesia's rapidly deteriorating economic and military situation, coupled with an alarming level of immigration and consequent loss of white morale, hardly refuse. Furthermore, as an added inducement the United States had underwritten the proposal with the offer of a two billion dollar development fund. The Rhodesians had absolutely nothing to lose, as at very worst, they would have two years of international trade during which they could revive the economy, build up their arms, diplomatic relations, raise white confidence, morale and immigration, yet with all this the carrot was not attractive enough and, with American prompting South Africa had to wield the stick. South Africa threatened to halt its fifty per cent sponsorship of the Rhodesian Defence Budget, further delay the transportation of Rhodesian war supplies and the fuel supply was reduced to 19,6 days. 'Vorster is the bad guy' was Rhodesia's comment as Smith's³² 'Not in a thousand years'³³

changed to 'Majority rule in two years.' Kissinger and the British Government lauded this acceptance as a 'Victory for realism and common sense.'³⁴

Zanu, who not surprisingly^{HAD} not been consulted, rejected the proposals in their entirety. Mugabe said "What is required is the total destruction of Smith's army and its immediate replacement by Zanu forces we shouldn't worry about the Kissinger-British proposals. They can put in any puppet government they want, but a puppet government cannot contain us,³⁵ but the Chinese suggested 'revolutionary dual tactics', i.e., 'why not try talking as well'.³⁶ Nkomo said, 'His (Kissinger's) ideas were of no interest to us.'³⁷ Nyrere, however called a conference to create a United National front to accept the proposals. Later at a meeting on 9 October 1976, in Lusaka, Zanu and Zapu formed the Patriotic Front, so as to present a United front for negotiations . The Patriotic Front, in Mugabi's words was "a marriage of convenience"³⁸ and both parties kept their autonomy. They, however, rejected the proposals in their present form, but agreed to meet in Geneva, with the British and Rhodesian representatives to discuss the proposals. The commonwealth Heads of Government announced that 'the armed struggle has become complementary to other efforts, including a negotiated settlement.'³⁹

At the Geneva Conference of October 1976, little common ground existed between the rivals, and it became the "Do-Nothing"
⁴⁰
Conference, Smith would not agree to one man, one vote, and the Patriotic Front would accept nothing less and what is more, the war took a dramatic upswing at this time - during the seven weeks

of the conference, the Rhodesian Security Forces claimed 321 kills, (they had only claimed 304 during the whole of 1975) and there were an estimated two thousand guerrillas inside Rhodesia.⁴¹

A factor which had a significant effect on the political negotiations of 1976 was the increase in cross-border raids. These had been carried out since 1965, but they were clandestine, very small, generally short range operations carried out by S.A.S. Commandos under C.I.O. direction. These raids gradually increased in both size and scope but remained essentially the 'hot-pursuit', or clandestine type, and entirely military in design, that is they were used to gather intelligence through the capture of personnel and documents, or to destroy equipment or kill insurgents or disrupting infiltration routes. Rhodesian Commandos also laid landmines⁴² and pursued 'divide and rule' tactics by perpetrating hostile Acts on other groups in the hope that they would blame each other, vide the Chitepo Assassination. This, of course, did have a spin-off in diminishing the Nationalists morale, but was not specifically designed to influence either white morale or political negotiations. In 1976 this pattern changed dramatically with the Selous Scouts/S.A.S. attack on Nyandzonia and Pungwe during August. This followed Machel's closure of the Mozambiquian border, in March, and the seizure of the railway rolling stock, plus a steady increase in cross-border hit and run raids, including mortar attacks on Umtali. With intelligence gathered from captured guerrillas and aerial photographs, and inspired by the Entebbe raid, a motorised column of seventy two men from Rhodesia, invaded Mozambique, and in the holocaust that followed some one thousand Zimbabweans were killed. Salisbury

claimed three hundred "terrorists" were killed and described the camp as purely military⁴³, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, however, announced that Nyandozonia was an official refugee camp, denouncing Salisbury for perpetrating the atrocity⁴⁴. The truth was however, somewhere in between - the camp was neither, it was under Zipra military control and between a third to a half of its approximately 5 000 inhabitants (almost exclusively Zimbabwean) were undergoing military training.⁴⁵



Conflicting views on the value of this and similar attacks exist, for 1976 saw a dramatic increase in guerrilla insurgency. For in this year alone, Rhodesia suffered 92% of all her casualties - since 1972; while her kill ratio fell to below the significant 10:1 level.⁴⁶

White morale and confidence was discipating fast, as the Security Forces failed to stern the flood of Nationalist infiltration. The external, more especially the 'Thousand Kill' raids captured the public imagination and helped raise morale, demonstrating as they did Rhodesian Military superiority. But their strategic value is questionable; apart from their cosmetic importance as a propaganda exercise, for it has been shown that the majority of those killed were at best recruits, and their demise had little practical effect on the most important component in the war - the guerrilla in the field. Moreover, these attacks attracted international approbrium which manifested itself in economic, diplomatic and psychological terms, revealing also to the guerrillas, precisely how ineffectual the Rhodesian military were at combatting the



... An aerial photograph of the Nyadzonya/Pungwe base taken at 30 000 feet by Wing Commander Randy Durandt, flying a Canberra bomber. A count by photographic interpreters revealed that at least 800 terrorists were mustered on parade

Map shows the route of the Selous Scouts on Operation Eland



Mass grave of Zimbabwean refugees killed by Rhodesian troops in attack on Nyadzonia camp, Mozambique, August 1976.³¹



internal situation. This, allied with international support and sympathy did much to stiffen the Nationalist resolve to continue their fight.

Gann and Hendriksen feel the raids were functional, as the Rhodesians with very little effort, extended the theatre of the war, kept the guerrillas off balance and insecure, affected morale adversely, destroyed vital equipment and gathered much vital and useful intelligence. Furthermore, they felt the Rhodesians had little to lose, for Gann and Hendrikson also point to the value of military superiority at the negotiating table. They also question whether Rhodesia had any real choice, other than to launch a policy of strategic offensive - offence may not only be the best defence, in Rhodesia's situation it may have been the sole viable defence. Portugal's 'laager' or 'fortified garrison' policy had proved to have been a disastrous failure, conversely, Vietnam had demonstrated the failure of the strategic offensive. Ken Flower, however felt that the military advantage of such raids was far outweighed by the political disadvantage: the C.I.O. Paper 'Threat to Rhodesia' stated 'The effort to counter subversive activities was in the proportion of 20% Military and 80% Political.'⁴⁷ The raid embarrassed the South Africans and seriously jeopardised the chance of a negotiated settlement. Flower is accurate in his assessment that actual kills of guerrillas (especially untrained men in base camp) are not really significant, for the ease with which more could be recruited made this contraindicative. The Rhodesians were already suffering a severe military manpower shortage, forcing them to extend call-ups both in duration and in the ages of those recruited, meanwhile Zanla had increased

its membership from approximately 100 (in 1964) to ~~(by 1976)~~
over 7 000 trained guerrillas by 1976. Zapu had a further
2 000 under arms. ⁴⁸ Sadly, once again, the Government's
failure to win 'hearts and minds' proved conclusive.

IV THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT

By 1977 Rhodesia was clearly losing the war, since 1972, Defence expenditure had risen by over three hundred per cent, to over 1 million Rhodesian dollars per day.¹ Due to the disruption of agricultural production and a massive shortage of industrial and commercial workers caused by increased military call-ups, the economy was slipping fast; immigration, despite financial restraints on immigrants, was rampant, and South Africa to, was showing signs of withdrawal.

White confidence and morale was not high, and since July 1976, cases of urban 'terrorism' had occurred, which reached a head in August, 1977, when a bomb exploded in Salisbury, killing eleven civilians (three whites), and injuring seventy six others.²

Salisbury was forced to admit that an estimated 2 350 guerrillas were at large in the country: Five hundred in 'Hurricane', a thousand in 'Thresher', six hundred and fifty in 'Repulse' and two hundred in 'Tangent',³ while there were probably many more insurgents spread throughout Rhodesia. The situation was desperate, the security forces were losing a man a day⁴ while the patriots were gaining members, so with no military solution at hand, Smith was obliged to return to the negotiating table, his 1976 talks with Nkomo having foundered.

Andrew Young the American Ambassador to the United Nations, and Dr Owen British Foreign Secretary, launched a new round of negotiations. These proposed that a British Resident Commissioner take over a transitional Government, while a neutral international or United Nation's peace-keeping force would ensure 'free and

fair' elections based on the 'one man one vote' principle and that of an independent judiciary. These proposals were roundly rejected, however the Patriotic Front was divided on this issue, with Mugabe refusing to compromise, while Smith, bolstered by his usual total electoral victory (31st August, 1977), and, following South Africa's disenchantment with Jimmy Carter⁵, renewed South African support, plus the promise of internal negotiations also refused the Owen/Young proposals. During this period, Ian Smith also threatened to launch pre-emptive strikes against Zipra and Zambian positions. Kaunda replied by declaring a state of war existed between Rhodesia and Zambia, but neglected to activate the Zambian Army.

During late 1977, Smith initiated negotiations with the internal Nationalist leaders, Mugorewa, Sithole and Chirau. Bishop Muzorewa demanded 'If you are now prepared to accept universal adult suffrage, not in practice, but in principle then we are in business.'⁶ Much to his amazement Smith's reply was 'yes, provided he received guarantees to whites.'⁷ Compromise and discussion were achieved and the negotiations 'became almost routine.' The only factor threatening negotiation was the November raid on Chimio and Tembe, these bases containing over five thousand Zimbabweans, were repeated, over two days, attacked by aircraft and helicopter-borne troops. At the conclusion of the operation, a conservative estimate of casualties was over twelve hundred dead in the camps, for the loss of one Rhodesian soldier.^{8, 9} Again, the value of this exercise was questionable, as the Internal Talks were seriously jeopardized, and the effects on the guerrillas were inconclusive.

Maluka, a fourteen year old (armed with a rifle) stated, after he had seen his parents killed, "We must free our people from the yoke of imperialism we will triumph over the racist oppressors." Other, smaller operations, such as Operation Virile¹⁰, which destroyed Mozambiquan infrastructure.

Negotiations continued despite the raid, and on 3 March 1978 the 'Salisbury Four' signed an agreement to a transitional, Multiracial Government. Smith, had received a clear mandate from the Whites to initiate 'one man, one vote.' This he did, but Whites retained firm control over the economy, Civil Service, Judiciary and Security Forces, while Smith himself continued holding of the reins of power in the Zimbabwe - Rhodesia Government which seriously compromised Muzorewa's claim to its legitimacy. One reason perhaps the main one, for the Chimio Raids was to lessen the blow to white morale, and sensibilities, of 'one man, one vote', however this aim was only partially successful for the white mood remained gloomy. Nkomo promptly denounced the agreement as a 'Multi-racial charade, an attempt to fool the world.'¹¹ He praised the Anglo-American decision, taken at Malta, not to acknowledge the 'puppet government of Muzorewa, until all parties had been consulted.'¹² Then Nkomo re-entered negotiations with Smith. The United Nations rejected the Internal Settlement, they described it as 'inadequate' and while Britain vacillated Zanu rejected the 'settlement' completely and increased its level of infiltration. However, Muzorewa was very optimistic.

'Heavy! Heavy! Our struggle is over. Our victory has been won!' ; as was Sithole, who said 'I am delighted... This is an achievement that we shall back with our very lives.'¹³

Muzorewa's Government made no significant contribution to curbing the Guerrilla War, which according to whites was its main purpose, in fact in introducing 'Auxillaries' to the fray it was to considerably complicate matters. The Smith/Nkomo negotiations, which to all accounts were proceeding smoothly, ended abruptly, in what Smith called 'a stroke of fate.'¹⁴



A ZANU poster deriding the internal settlement.

Rhodesian Ministry of Information press release:

TERRORIST WAR CASUALTIES
(Circulated for general information)

The following figures, based on communiques issued during the period commencing on 21 December 1972 and ending on 31 July 1978, represent the total numbers of casualties to date in the terrorist war. These figures do *not* include those terrorists killed during external operations by the Security Forces. Monthly statistics for the whole period quoted above and more detailed information than that given below are available on request at the Department of Information library.

	JAN '78	FEB '78	MAR '78	APR '78	MAY '78	JUN '78	JUL '78	1978 TOTALS	TOTALS SINCE 21/12/72
SECURITY FORCES KILLED IN ACTION	25	21	30	14	12	12	20	134	546
TERRORISTS KILLED	205	190	202	96	120	168	291	1272	4963
WHITE CIVILIANS MURDERED	15	6	3	11	14	24	13	86	207
BLACK CIVILIANS MURDERED BY TERRORISTS	81	64	66	55	72	92	172	602	1712
KILLED BY L/MINE	21	3	3	2	13	23	1	66	296
COLLABORATORS	26	59	20	18	57	52	23	255	645
RECRUITS	1	1	3	-	5	33	-	43	261
FAIL TO HALT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62
CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE	12	27	24	42	1	23	5	134	263
LOOTERS	1	1	-	6	4	4	-	16	26
CURFEW BREAKERS	-	-	4	-	52	-	-	56	322
SECURITY FORCES MURDERED WHILE OFF DUTY AND UNARMED	11	5	1	2	4	3	-	26	106
TOTAL BLACK CIVILIANS KILLED	153	160	121	125	208	230	201	1198	3693
OVERALL TOTALS	398	377	356	246	354	442	517	2690	9402

V THE VISCOUNT HUNYANI AND 'GREEN LEADER'

By 1978 the security situation had deteriorated to such an extent that armed convoys had been introduced on all main routes - everyone agreed that in Rhodesia the safest way to travel was by air.

On 3 September an Air Rhodesia Viscount carrying four crew and fifty two passengers took off from Kariba Airport¹ bound for Salisbury. Five minutes into the flight, with plane crossing the Urungwe Tribal Trust Lands, there was an explosion and the inner starboard engine burst into flame. Salisbury Air Control received a distress call 'Mayday, Mayday ... two starboard engines failed', and the pilot attempted to land in a cotton field. Unfortunately the plane hit an irrigation ditch and exploded, but eighteen of the fifty six people on board survived the crash. A group of five went in search of water for the more seriously injured. Mr Hill, a passenger on this flight reported that after about half an hour, nine armed guerrilla's appeared on the scene, so he and another couple hid, initially the guerrillas made friendly overtures to the survivors, but after a few minutes without any warning, and at point blank range, they machine gunned their ten prisoners. Mr Hill described this as a 'brutal, cold-blooded massacre'. Amongst the dead were the two seriously injured air hostesses, four women with children, and an old man crippled with arthritis.² The survivors were rescued the following day by S.A.S. paratroopers. The Rhodesians, initially denied that the plane had been shot down, but a week later, they admitted that it had been hit by a Soviet




A Rhodesian Airways Viscount. Two of these planes were shot down by ZIPRA terrorists with Sam-7 missiles



12. On the 3rd September 1978 ZIPRA terrorists shot down Air Rhodesia Viscount Hunyani. 30 members of the passengers and crew died. They then went to the disaster scene and bayoneted or shot 10 of the survivors

13. View of the Viscount Hunyani shoot-down taken from the air



Strela 9M 32, better known as the Sam-7 or 'Grail'.³

Public outrage at this act was not confined to Rhodesia : in South Africa it was exacerbated by erroneous newspaper reports claiming that the women had been raped and bayoneted. The W.C.C. condemned the act⁴ while conservative British newspapers also denounced the 'Massacre'. The Yorkshire Post called it 'senseless slaughter' while the Sun stated 'The mask has slipped from the face of Joshua Nkomo. In a sickening radio interview on Tuesday, (5 September) he openly boasted that his men shot down the airliner.⁵ Nkomo claimed that the viscount was a legitimate target as 'The Rhodesian's have been ferrying military personnel and equipment in viscounts'.⁶ In his biography,⁷ Nkomo said that viscounts had been used to transport paratroops and equipment for the Chimoio raid. Travers Head of Air Rhodesia refuted this claim saying 'This is a downright, deliberate lie' ... this had never happened in Rhodesia.'⁸ Nkomo was seen to gloat and chuckle over the downing of the plane, which infuriated the Rhodesians, however he excused this, saying it was merely his way of evading the question as to whether he had ground to air missiles. He later said, 'It was a tragic mistake. I felt it personally'⁹ as^a friend Mr Gulab was on the plane. He denied that Zipra had killed any survivors. 'Some of our Zipra boys did approach the crash site and did help the eight survivors to get to safety, bringing them water and looking after them.'¹⁰ Dr Ndlovu, Zapu's United Nations Representative, however, admitted to killing the survivors as a demonstration that the area was a 'frozen area' (that is, a war zone) in guerrilla hands, but denied

that any women or children had been harmed.¹¹ Few people believed the guerrilla's account of the situation.

Smith denounced Nkomo as 'a monster (who) has put himself beyond the pale, by what he has done.'¹² The government cracked down on Nkomo's internal supporters; arresting between a hundred and fifty and two hundred of them¹³ declaring martial law in extensive areas and issuing D-notices against Nationalist organisations. Yet this did little to appease the public, who demanded revenge. At a memorial service for the crash victims a mourner commented "If that is not a Satanic Act, what is? You don't make a pact with the Devil. He should be shot.' On 8 September the Very Reverend John da Costa in his fiery Deafening Silence sermon,¹⁵ condemned the act as 'murder of the most sarage and treacherous sort,' adding, 'this beastiality, worse than anything in recent history, stinks in the nostrils of heaven' and went on to attack the media, the U.N. and the World Council of Churches, as 'parading pseudo-morality, which like all half-truths, is more dangerous than the lie direct.' The sermon was not an attack on the Nationalists exclusively, but on all violence, including that of the Government, but it was not perceived as such.

Calls for cross-border retaliation against Zâpra were common, while military frustration arising from failure to contain the internal situation made retaliating a certainty. Advanced intelligence was gathered from aerial photography, captured guerrillas, C.I.O. intelligence and Selous Scout spies and Reconnaissance teams,¹⁶ and in extreme secrecy, one of the most significant raids of the entire war, was planned by Comops.

An airstrike on Westlands Farm, the Zipra Headquarters, seventeen kilometers north of Lusaka and code named "Operation Gatling."¹⁷ The attack was carried out by eight Hunter and four Canberra Bombers, supported by four K-Cars (i.e. helicopter gunships) who's limited range would necessitate refueling in Zambia at a field secured by Rhodesian forces. Following on this attack, a force of 165 S.A.S. troops would strike Mkushi Camp 125 Km north east of Lusaka, and eight satellite camps holding about a thousand individuals.¹⁸

A third attack would be launched on Zipra's C.G.T.-2 (Communist Guerrilla Training) camp, 100 kilometers east of Lusaka, this target contained about four thousand inhabitants.¹⁹ Air Force strikes would be followed by a helicopter borne R.L.I. envelopment.

On 17 October a series of small diversionary raids were launched against Zanla forces along the Mozambique border. The next day the R.A.F. started the first overt combined ground/air pre-emptive strike on Zambia. The arrival for 8.30 am of the various strike groups at Westlands Freedom Camp was perfectly synchronized. The Hunters flew past, each dropping a thousand pound bomb on the unsuspecting guerrillas, and before they could recover, the Canberra's were there, each dropping three hundred anti-personnel alpha bombs, only to be followed by the K-cars contributing to the slaughter with their 20 mm cannon - the death toll in this particular raid was estimated at 800, with even greater numbers of casualties, however Nkomo admitted to only 226 dead and 600 injured.²⁰



**PRIDE
AND POWER
IN
DEFENCE**




8. The Hawker Hunters opened the attack.


Then came the Canberras . . .



**RHODESIAN
AIR FORCE
PROVIDES THE PUNCH**



10. The K-cars and troop-carrying G-cars . . .



The Rhodesians made a tape recording of the raid, and in the 'Green Leader' cockpit recording they had a propaganda tool superior even to the spectacular death toll exacted at Westland Freedom Camp. This was broadcast on 22 October by Rhodesia Broadcasting Company and in the radio conversation between "Green Leader" and Lusaka Air Control Tower. "Green Leader," (the call sign of the leading Rhodesian Hunter) radio'ed the Zambian Air Controller requesting that he pass a message on to the Air Force Station at Mumbwa. The message read,:



'We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no quarrel - repeat no quarrel - with Zambia or her security forces. We therefore ask you not to intervene or oppose our attack. However, we are arbiting your airfield at this time and are under orders to shoot down any Zambian Air Force aircraft which does not comply with this request and attempts to take off. Did you copy all that? The controller acknowledged the message as "copied".²¹

This was clearly a propaganda ploy, as was indicated by the tape when the pilot asks 'Where's this ..(beep) ... piece of speech.'²²

Obviously the pilot was reading a prepared statement. The Nationalists pointed out another section of the tape recorded during the actual attack, which contained some very insulting terms such as 'Gooks', 'Kaffirs' and other obscenities, but this is understandable, and will occur in any tense war situation.

The rest of 19 October attacks proceeded as planned, the air force struck Mkushi and the S.A.S. went in. The only surprise being that the camp was populated mostly by women. Intelligence had not been able to warn them about this as aerial photographs were unable to distinguish between the sexes. The women, however, were not raw recruits and the only S.A.S. casualty was claimed by one of them. Documents, signal equipment, weapons munitions and other equipment was seized, including a number of prisoners and, interestingly, a full Russian General's uniform. A Zambian *Mig* appeared, but closely watched by a Hunter armed with air to air missiles, decided very wisely, not to take any active part in the proceedings. The attack on C.G.T.-2 by the R.L.I was relatively uneventful, as the guerrillas, warned by earlier attacks had deemed it expedient to absent themselves and only fifty one were killed.²³ Mkushi was secured, and the following day the Press was brought in. A female instructor, Phinah Malaba was interrogated and revealed that the camp had housed 2036 people, 1000 trained guerrillas and a thousand recruits - and that all the instructors had been trained in Angola.²⁴ As the S.A.S. were pulling out, a group of soldiers attempted to re-take the camp but were repulsed with heavy losses.

General Walls said that the raids had been enormously successful and claimed that at least 1 500 guerrillas had been killed, exclusive of the Freedom Camp raid.²⁵ He added "We sure gave them a pretty hefty knock, from which they will no doubt take a long time to recover," but warned, 'the war was not over yet.'²⁶ Nkomo denounced the attacks, saying 'Mkushi was occupied entirely by girl refugees with no military connection at all.' He also





Operation Gatling: Map showing attack on ZIPRA's Mkushi terror camps with inset showing other phases of operation



The ammunition store at ZIPRA's Mkushi camp deep inside Zambia blazes fiercely as the SAS destroy the base

said ninety one of these girls had been massacred by the white soldiers, who seemed to have been mercenaries ... the black troops under their command helped large numbers of girls to escape, and came close to mutinying against their orders.²⁷ Nkomo further claimed spectacular successes over the R.A.F., Sam 7 missiles he said, had brought down thirty planes and helicopters. These claims were patently ludicrous and conflicted with all the evidence and press reports. Eddie Adams, for instance one of the correspondents flown into Mkushi, described Soviet and Chinese weapons, tunnels and trenches,²⁸ while another reporter noted "almost all the dead clutched soviet-made S.K.S. assault rifles."²⁹

The Rhodesian public was well satisfied with the raids and morale was restored. Mrs Hosak said 'The spirits of those who perished in the Viscount Air Massacre can now rest peacefully in the knowledge that justice has been done.'³⁰ The Rev. da Costa when asked to comment on the pre-emptive raids and deaths of women and children replied "Those women and children are camp followers of terrorists they are just troops comforts breeding the new breed. Israel finds pre-emptive raids necessary, so why not Rhodesia?"³¹ The raids certainly boosted white morale, Zambia's relations with Zipra were strained, especially over Zipra harrassment of white farmers in Zambia and the fact that Zipra guerrillas took to shooting at all aircraft, and even succeeded in bringing down two Zambian Migs. However, the raids, elicited international obloquy; ~~St~~ Angus Niel (S.A.S) without really intending to, summed up the Rhodesian predicament when he said 'Offensive action is our only hope, there are so many of them', but admitted 'We can't survive without outside help.'³² Raids failed to stop or even diminish the war, as Zipra's internal



RHODESIA'S IMPORTANCE IN THE WORLD (THE WAY WE SEE IT—FIRST THINGS FIRST!)


Rose Martin, Meet the Rhodesians, Books of Rhodesia, Bulawayo, 1978.

operators remained undetered and in any case only a fraction of Zipra's total force had been affected. Proof of Zipra's continued activity was not long in coming, for in December 1978 an R.P.G. - rocket attack destroyed the Salisbury fuel depot and at the same time, nearly did the same thing to white morale. The only bright spot was that Kaunda, despite the Zambian raids, had been forced by economic circumstances and famine to re-open the border.

VI LANCASTER HOUSE AND INDEPENDENCE

While Rhodesia was losing the war, the guerrillas were not winning it. The huge increase in the number of insurgents was being balanced by the corresponding guerrilla mortality at the hands of the Security Forces, but the Rhodesians could not afford to lose even a single member of its civilian or military manpower, while cost of the war was draining the economy, compared to the 1968 level, the gross national product had dropped by 7% and at the same time the white population had fallen to 80% of what it had been eleven years previously.¹

In January 1979, Salisbury was forced by the calamitous military situation, to extend martial law. A Rhodesian Army Officer was heard to boast 'The only ground they have liberated is what they happen to be standing on at any particular moment.'² Unhappily, this was even more true of conditions prevailing among the Security Forces. Rhodesia, by her failure to protect her inhabitants from the incursions of dissidents, and the timeous introduction of sufficient good and appropriate reform had lost for ever the 'hearts and minds' of her people - the guerrillas promised liberation, all Smith could offer was war, suspicion and increasing repression. Salisbury was rapidly losing control of the Tribal Trust Lands as the administration collapsed under the strains of attack and intimidation, schools closed and rural sabotage was endemic. Politics and the War being inseparable, the only solution to the Rhodesia problem lay in the political area.



The women in this photograph were some of a group of ZANLA terrorists who moved into an assembly point a few days after the ceasefire began


ZAPU Terror:



A sketch of a ZIPRA terrorist as seen by Schullie.




ZANLA fighters meeting to plan strategy






ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army) forces in the bush

On the 12th February 1979 ZIPRA shot Air Rhodesia Viscount Umniati out of the sky with another Russian SAM-7 missile. It spiraled down and crashed into the immediate area shown in this photograph. There was no chance whatsoever of a crash landing. All 58 of the passengers and crew members died




Huge fire at the Birmingham Road fuel depot after it was rocketted by terrorists in Salisbury, 1979


The Altana Farm attack signalled the commencement of Operation Hurricane. Map shows the boundaries of the various operational areas of the Security Forces as they were when the war ended in 1980



These maps show how Rhodesia's illegal regime greatly restricted the lives of its people in order to maintain power and control. The black areas were declared 'martial law areas', where the regime's armed forces had absolute power over the local population. Note how martial law areas expanded from 1978 (left) to 1980 (right).




The Deployment of the Rhodesian Security Forces in the Late 1970s



ZANLA's operational sectors as at the ceasefire. Rubatsiro sector was not used after rear base facilities were withdrawn by Zambia. Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira sectors came into operation in December 1972. The remaining sectors came gradually into use once rear bases were established in Mozambique after the Portuguese handover to FRELIMO. The sector

boundaries show where terrorist groups were actually resident. They were open ended because ZANLA was still moving westwards at the ceasefire. The arrowed line indicates the limit up to where reconnaissance groups and political commissars were operating and 'politicising and organising the people' - euphemisms for intimidation and murder



ZIPRA's operational 'fronts' as at the ceasefire and their infiltration routes. Mozambique never granted them rear base facilities, so Southern Front's regions 1 and 2 were never brought into operation. Many areas were heavily infiltrated by ZIPRA, but they never controlled any area of the country

Zanla Attacks and Targets Between 1977 and 1979*

Methods of Attack	Number of attacks Jan 1977 - Aug 1979
Surprise attacks	
District commissioner's offices, military and police outposts, and the fuel depot in Salisbury	444
White farmsteads destroyed	21
White farmers killed	28
Protected villages destroyed	23
War planes shot down	54
Rhodesian soldiers killed	4 162
Ambush	
Ambushing of commercial delivery vans and police and military convoys	410
Rhodesian army vehicles captured and/or destroyed	470
Sabotage operations	
Sabotaging of railway lines, stations, power lines, roads, etc.	401
Major bridges destroyed	13

* No data from Zanla sources were obtainable prior to 1977.

Zanla Combatants Killed Between 1966 and 1980

Year	Number of Deaths
1966	8
1967	1
1972	3
1973	10
1974	20
1975	5
1976	213
1977	1 404
1978	986
1979	2 056
1980	42

Direct Causes of Zanla Deaths Between 1966 and 1980

Causes of Death	1966	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Air Attacks	8					40		90	464		602
Surprise Attacks		3	4	2		85	477	330	437		1 338
Killed in Action			2	12	3	6	16	42	285		366
Captured and Killed			4		1					2	7
Ambushes						20	64	70	126	1	281
Land Mines							8	9	33	1	51
Poisoned Clothing							8	7			15
Total	8	3	10	14	4	151	573	548	1 345	4	2 660

Recognising this, Smith started his "Yes" campaign for an internal settlement and despite the rocket attack on a second Viscount, which claimed fifty nine lives³, duly received his mandate. In the April elections held to elect a government for the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Bishop Muzorewa and the U.A.N.C. won a resounding victory, amid loud cries of "foul" from the other black political parties. Official statistics show that 64% of the 2.8 million voters cast their ballot⁴ and most objective observers including inter alia, Lennox Boyd, the former Colonial Secretary, pronounced them to be 'Free and Fair'.⁵ Nonetheless, the U.N. refused to recognise the Muzorewa Government, on the grounds that the elections had taken place in a war situation, and the external nationalists had not been included. The new government really did have a serious legitimacy problem. Smith remained, apparently still in control, 'Rhodesia' was retained as part of the name, cross-border raids continued, but most significant however was Muzorewa's failure to stop, or even contain, the internal war. Not even, the election in May of a new conservative British Government under Margaret Thatcher, was able to produce the anxiously awaited recognition of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka placed Mrs Thatcher under intense pressure, including the threat to exclude Britain from the commonwealth, so she was forced to admit the 'settlement was defective'⁵ and accept an all-party constitutional conference which included the Nationalists. The Zimbabwe-Rhodesian's had little choice other than to attend, as the military situation, although stalemated, was desperate. South Africa wanted peace and was pursuing her 'Constellation of States' policy, while the Carter administration in the U.S.A. demanded an acceptable settlement and the British

Conservative Government was unable to grant the country independence, due to international pressure. The Nationalist leaders, however, were in a strong position. Nkomo had hatched a plan for a conventional invasion of Rhodesia, for his guerrillas had already been trained in conventional warfare and with the support of Russian armour and aircraft manned by Soviet trained crews they were preparing for a January, 1980, 25-day. The chances of this invasion were not good, but the Rhodesian forces could not hope to match it in armour or airpower, and this force could have damaged Salisbury's position beyond repair. Mugabe, in particular, was radically opposed to negotiating anything other than the immediate 'capitulation' of the Salisbury regime.

This is where the cross-border raids aided the Rhodesian position. Just prior to, and during the Lancaster House conference, which met on 10 September 1979, to negotiate a settlement, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces launched a series of raids. A R.L.I. and Selous Scout assault on New Chimoio in Mozambique encountered an entrenched guerrilla force of over 6 000 men. The air strike called in for support, claimed the lives of over 3 000 guerrillas the largest 'cull' of the entire war.⁶ More significant, however, was the systematic destruction of the Mozambique and Zambian infrastructure, this being primarily an economic attack on the Front Line States, and it was this, that was the most effective. Kaunda correctly identified, the purpose of the carrot and the stick as 'crippling the economy and getting Zambia to force concessions from the Patriotic Front', and this is exactly what he did, for despite

his rhetoric, the war had cost Zambia more than K2 000 000 000.⁷ Mozambique was even harder hit, for in 1979 alone, damage to the communications network was over twenty six million U.S. dollars.⁸ The front line states, including Nyere, were forced to support the settlement or face economic collapse. Nkomo admitted that 'pressure on us to reach a settlement was intense. The front line states were being ruined by the war, much to South Africa's advantage. Everyone was sick of war.'⁹

Despite the pressure on Salisbury and the Nationalists to reach a compromise, a mutually acceptable settlement was by no means a foregone conclusion, Lord Carrington who chaired the conference, used masterful diplomacy, while the various external forces kept up a steady pressure on the delegates. After three months of intense and often strained negotiation, agreement was finally reached on 6 December 1979. Lord Soames arrived in Rhodesia, to head the transitional government, while a commonwealth/U.N. monitoring force was soon to follow. Finally, on the 27 December, 1979, almost exactly seven years after the war began in earnest, the ceasefire was signed - The War was Over.

CONCLUSION

In April 1980, Zimbabwe finally received its independence. Robert Mugabe head of Zanu (PF) won a resounding victory in the internationally accepted elections in March, and made good his promise to end a decade and a half of war.

The actual casualting in the war were relatively small, at approximately 16 000; the guerrillas lost 8250 men in action while the Security forces lost 954 while just over 1000 civilians were killed, this is less than 0,5 percent of the population.¹ Nevertheless, the country was in a sorry state, farms stood idle or abandoned, administration had disintegrated in all but the urban centres and the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. The Rhodesian armed forces had, however, retained military ascendancy, denying the guerrillas stable internal bases, and the war Rhodesia had lost was the war for world opinion, her calls on 'kith and kin' and highlighting the 'communist threat' had failed to prevail over the Nationalists calls for liberty, and most importantly she had failed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people.

Tactics is the craft of winning battles, and the Rhodesian forces repeatedly demonstrated their supremacy in this art, but strategy is the art of using battles to win victory and here the Nationalists prevailed. They used battles, especially those that they lost, to win international support and the Rhodesian's pre-emptive raids while contributing little to the Rhodesian war effort, were exploited by Nkomo and Mugabe, who were far better politicians than they were military leaders, to gain

ultimate victory; while their guerrilla forces ground away at the whites will and ability to resist. In 1980, Mugabe admitted 'We did not win a military victory, otherwise we would have done so. We reached a political settlement ... a compromise.' ²

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. The title of a book by Robert Faber.
2. Gann, S. and Hendriksen, T. The struggle for Zimbabwe : Battle in the Bush. (Praeger : New York, 1981), p 66.
3. A thorough study of Moaist strategy, with special reference to Zanu is undertaken in Pandya, P. Mao Tse-tung and Chimerenga. (Skotaville Publishers : Braamfontein, 1988).

Chapter 1 : The Roots of the Conflict

1. Raeburn, M. Black Fire (Julian Friedmann Publishers : London, 1978), p 4.
2. Wilkinson, A.R. Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957 to 1973. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies : London, 1973).
3. Wilkinson, p 1.
4. Wilkinson, p 1.
5. Pandya, p 67 and Silundika, G. Zimbabwe : Zanu 2, Interviews. (L.S.M. Information Centre : Richmond, Canada, 1974).
6. Wilkinson, p 3.

Chapter II : The Second Chimerenga

1. See Flower, K. Serving Secretly (Galago Alberton, 1987), pages 31 to 38 for further detail.
2. Flower, p 61.

3. Raeburn, p 6.
4. Wilkinson, p 8.
5. Wilkinson, p 7.
6. In The Fight for Zimbabwe (Rex Collings : London, 1975) and Black Fire respectively.
7. Raeburn, p 6.
8. Pandya, p 162.
9. Wilkinson, p 11.
10. Raeburn, p 7.
11. Raeburn, p 7.
12. Interview of G. Sibendika, Zapa Publicity and Information Secretary in Zimbabwe : Zapu 2.
13. Flower, p 110.
14. Interview of Edward Ndlovu, Zapu National secretary, in Zimbabwe : Zapu 2.
15. Maxey, p 128.
16. For a comprehensive summary of the economic war see Flower, pages 61 to 78.
17. Raeburn, p 50.
18. Raeburn, p 8.
19. Zanu slogan.

Chapter III : War and Pearce

1. Sithole, N Letters from Salisbury Prison (Transafrica : Nairobi, 1976) p 64.
2. Raeburn, p 11.
3. Ndlovu interview.

4. Ndlovu interview.
5. Muzorewa, A. Rise Up and Walk
(Levans : London, 1978), p 123.
6. Sithole, p 65.
7. Muzorewa, p 123.
8. Natal Mercury, 24 March 1972.
9. Rhodesia Herald, 18 September 1971.
10. Scully, P. Exit Rhodesia (Cottswold Press : Ladysmith,
1984), p 32.
11. Daily News, 17 December 1972.
12. Flower, p 11.
13. Raeburn, p 18.
14. Pandya, p 100.
15. Moorcroft, P.S. A Short Thousand Years.
(Galaxie Press : Salisbury, 1980) p 172.
16. Muzorewa, p 131.
17. Muzorewa, p 131.
18. Raeburn, p 23.
19. Muzorewa, p 138.
20. Muzorewa, 138.
21. Muzorewa, 139.
22. Muzorewa, p 139.
23. Muzorewa, p 165.
24. Raeburn, p 36.
25. Muzorewa, p 140.
26. Nyangoni, C. and Nyandoro, G. (eds)
Zimbabwe Independence Movements : Select
Documents (Rex Collings : London, 1979), p 308.
27. Flower, p 147 - 150.
28. Natal Witness, 20 March 1985.
29. Daily News, 18 March 1976.

30. Burdette, M.M. Zambia : Between Two Worlds (Westview Press : Boulder Colorado, 1988), p 188.
31. Daily News, 23 August 1976.
32. Raeburn, p 43.
33. Moorcroft, p 154.
34. Berlyn, P. The Quite Man (Collins : Salisbury, 1978), p 227.
35. Verrier, A. Road to Zimbabwe, 1890 - 1980.
(Jonathan Cape : London, 1986) p 198.
36. Moorcroft, p 168.
37. Nkomo, J. The Story of My Life
(Methuen : London, 1984), p 171.
38. Moorcroft, p 165.
39. Verrier, p 344.
40. Muzorewa, p 220.
41. Caute, D. Under the Skin (Allen Lane : 1983) p 169.
42. A good example of the value of the SAS minelaying operations was the killing of 'Nikita' Monena in 1978, which, once again was blamed on party rivalry and not the Rhodesians - recounted in Moorcroft, p 164 and Cole, B. The Elite (Three Knights : Pietermaritzburg, 1984) p 215.
43. Caute, p 47.
44. Stiff, P. Selous Scouts : A Pictoral (Galago : Alberton, 1984), p 98 and Daly, R. R and Stiff P. Selous Scouts : Top Secret War (Galago : Alberton, 1982), p 178 to 222 give a more detailed and dramatized account.

45. Gann and Hendriksen, p 80.
46. Caute, p 47.
47. Flower, p 150 to 152.
48. Daily News, 1 June 1976.

Chapter IV : 'Internal Settlement'

1. Cole, p 438.
2. Cole, p 438.
3. Raeburn, p 47.
4. Cole, p 437.
5. Nevertheless PiK Botha warned 'a peaceful settlement is no longer possible and these will have to be losers', Flower, p 182.
6. Muzorewa, p 230.
7. Muzorewa, p 230.
8. Flower claimed at least 2 000 dead and twice that number incapacitated, p 193.
9. Caute, p 120.
10. Caute, p 120.
11. Nkomo, p 187.
12. Nkomo, p 187.
13. Muzorewa, p 233.
14. Daily News, 3 March 1978.
15. Meredith, The Past is another Country (Andre Deutsch : London, 1979), p 347.

Chapter V : The Viscount Hunyani and 'Green Leader'

1. Caute, p 273.

2. Natal Mercury, 6 September 1978
3. Daily News, 14 August 1978
4. Natal Witness, 7 September 1978
5. Daily News, 6 September 1978
6. Daily News, 6 September 1978
7. Nkomo, p 166.
8. Natal Mercury, 12 April 1978
9. Nkomo, p 166.
10. Nkomo, p 166.
11. Natal Mercury, 6 September 1978
12. Meredith, p 348
13. Caute, p 282
14. Caute, p 277. This clearly also referred to the Smith/
Nkomo talks, which were summarily ended with the Viscount
incident.
15. da Costa, J.R. 'Deafening Silence'
Sermon preached by The Very reverend J.R. da Costa on
Friday, September 8, 1978.
16. A detailed account of one such spy is given in Daly
and Stiff pages 338 to 346.
17. Cowderoy, D. and Nesbit, R. War in the Air (Galago :
Alberton, 1987) offers a detailed description of the
strike, including an analysis of the hardware used.
18. Coke, p 225.
19. Cole, p 225.
20. Sunday Tribune, 22 October 1978.
21. Cockpit recording of the 'Green Leader' attack,
19 October 1978.

22. Ibid
23. Cole, p 231.
24. Sunday Tribune, 22 October 1978.
25. Sunday Tribune, 23 October 1978.
26. Daily News, 23 October 1978.
27. Nkomo, p
28. Frederikse, J. None but Ourselves
(Raven Press : Johannesburg, 1982), p 172.
29. Sunday Times, 22 October 1978.
30. Hill, D. The Last Days of White Rhodesia p 73.
31. Caute, p 278.
32. Caute, p 288.

Chapter VI

Lancaster House and Independence

1. Verrier, p 258.
2. Moorcraft, p 174.
3. Natal Mercury, 15 February 1979.
4. Flower, p 222.
5. Verrier, p 240.
6. Verrier, p 262.
7. Burdette, p 137.
8. Burdette, p 137.
9. Gann and Hendriksen, p 82.

Conclusion

1. Gann and Hendriksen, p 83.
2. Gann and Hendriksen, p 116.

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